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Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate the relevance of bank-lending channel (BLC) of 
monetary policy in a small-open economy, i.e. Malaysia by using disaggregated bank-
level data set. A dynamic panel data method namely GMM framework proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
have been used in estimating the dynamic of banks’ loan supply function. The empirical 
evidence has stated that monetary policy shocks is significantly and negatively 
influenced the banks’ loan supply, and therefore has supported the existence of BLC in 
Malaysia. In addition, several bank-characteristics variables namely bank liquidity and 
bank capitalization (capital adequacy ratio) are also statistically significant in 
influencing the banks’ loan supply. Therefore, the implementation of monetary policy is 
effective in influencing economic activity via bank balance sheet position, in particular 
bank loans. 
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1. Introduction 
The theory of transmission mechanism stated that monetary policy can influence real 
sector activity via several channels, namely interest rates channel, asset price channel, 
and credit channels.
1
 However, the role of bank credit has been given a special attention 
by the prior researchers in examining how monetary policy transmitted to the economic 
activity via credit channel. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) describe two possible 
mechanisms of the credit channel theory, namely balance-sheet channel (BSC), and 
bank-lending channel (BLC). The balance-sheet channel (BSC) has emphasized on the 
impact of the changes in monetary policy on the borrower’s balance sheet, whereas, the 
bank lending channel (BLC) has focused on the possible effect of monetary policy 
actions on the supply of loans by the banking system.  
 
 The bank lending channel is based on the view that bank plays an important role 
in the financial system as external sources of financing for the firms.  Because of the 
bank’s special role, certain borrower will highly dependent to the bank loan, and will 
not have access to the credit markets unless they borrow from bank. As argued by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), monetary policy can affect the bank portfolio behaviour 
through the bank asset in term of loan, securities as well bank reserves.  Therefore, it is 
believed that the bank lending channel plays an important role in affecting the economic 
activity. This is because any changes in the monetary policy stance will affect the bank 
behaviour in both asset, and liabilities side. For instance, a tight monetary policy will 
drain the reserves from the banking system, which in turn the bank will restrict the 
supply of loans, leading to a decline in investment spending, and fall in economic 
activity (output)
2
.  
 
 This paper aims to investigate the role of credit channel (in particular, BLC) in 
the monetary transmission in Malaysia by using the disaggregated bank-level data. By 
                                                 
1
 The detailed explanation about the channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism can be 
found  in Mishkin (1996).
 
2
 Schematically, the monetary policy effects on BLC can be summarised as follow; 
↓⇒M bank ↓deposit bank⇒ ↓loans ↓↓⇒⇒ YI , which is contractionary monetary policy leads 
to a fall in bank reserves and bank deposit; subsequently will decline in the bank loans, in turn contract 
the investment spending, and fall in output. 
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examining the relevance of BLC in economic activity, it can provide some idea to the 
monetary authority in designing an appropriate monetary policy in order to achieve their 
ultimate targets (for example, price stability and sustainable of economic growth). The 
relevance of BLC will be examined by estimating the banks’ loan supply function in 
dynamic panel data framework. Besides monetary policy variable, several 
macroeconomics variables (GDP, and inflation), and bank characteristics (bank size, 
liquidity, and capitalization) are also consider in estimating the banks’ loan supply 
function. 
 
 This study contribute to the existing literature by extending the analysis of the 
relevance of BLC of monetary policy in a small-open economy  by  using disaggregated 
data of commercial bank in Malaysia. Specifically, this study tries to answer two main 
questions? First, how does the monetary policy instrument that is overnight inter bank 
rate affect the bank lending behaviour? Second, do banks’ balance sheet variables 
namely bank capital, bank liquidity, and asset size matter in influencing the bank 
lending behaviour? In addition, this study uses the most recent panel data technique, 
that is the generalized method of moment (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and  recently extended by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). This technique has an advantage for addressing the Nickell (1981)  bias  
associated with the fixed effects in short panels (for example, bias due to the presence of 
the lagged dependent variable and bias due to the endogeneity of other explanatory 
variables). 
 
 Consistent with the previous finding in developed countries, there is a relevance 
role of bank lending channel of monetary policy in Malaysian. Specifically, as 
postulated by BLC theory, monetary policy variable has influenced significantly and 
negatively to the banks’ loan supply. In addition, several bank-characteristics variables 
namely bank liquidity and bank capitalization (capital adequacy ratio) are also play a 
significant role in influencing the banks’ loan supply. 
 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the 
previous study relating to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy via bank-
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lending channel. Section 3 deals with the theoretical aspect of the bank-lending 
behaviour. Section 4 explains the estimation procedures by using the dynamic panel 
data in GMM framework. Section 5 reports the empirical findings, and finally section 6 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The important role of credit channel in monetary policy transmission can be traced back 
by Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
3
. They argued that there are three conditions for the 
existence of the BLC, namely (i)loans and open-market bonds must not be perfectly 
substitute, (ii)the central bank is able to affect the bank loan by changing the quantity of 
reserves, and (iii)imperfect price adjustment that prevents any monetary shocks from 
being neutral. By using the traditional IS-LM model, where IS curve is replaced by the 
credit-commodity curve (CC), they produced CC-LM model where state that monetary 
policy can affects economic activity via credit channel or bank loan channel. For 
example, a tight monetary policy through an increase in interest rates will drain the bank 
reserves and deposit, and subsequently, the bank will contract the loan to the business 
and consumer.  
 
 There is well documented in the literature that most of the studies relating to the 
credit channel are focused on bank aggregate data. For example, Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992) have used innovation in 3-month Treasury Bills rate to capture exogenous shifts 
in monetary policy, and found that the inverse relationship between bank loans and tight 
monetary policy, and therefore have supported the credit channel view in the US 
economy. However, the are several studies have use the disaggregated data bank in 
investigating the existence of the bank lending channel particularly in the developed 
countries, especially in the US economy [for instance, Kashyap et al. (1995a, 1995b); 
Kashyap et al. (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), and Ashcraft  (2006)], in the UK 
study [Huang (2003), and Gambacorta (2005)], and Euro area study [Altunvas et al. 
(2002) and Angeloni et al. (2003)]
4
. The general conclusion in most of the studies is the 
                                                 
3
 The excellence literature review about the credit channel can be found in Mateu (2005), and Egert and 
MacDonald  (2009).  
4
 In Euro area, the role of banks in monetary transmission have been investigated by  Ehrmann et al. 
(2003) in  France, Germany, Italy, and Spain;  Worms (2003) in Germany; Hernando and Martinez-Pages 
(2003) in Spain; Loupias et al. (2003) in France; Brissimis et al. (2003) in Greece; Gambacorta (2003) in 
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tight monetary policy leads to a decline in bank credit (loans), which in turn has a 
negative impact to the economy. For example, Kashyap et al. (1995a, 1995b) found that 
the growth in bank loans in the sub-segment of the small commercial banks was most 
responsive to monetary policy. A further study by Kashyap et al. (2000) have divided 
banks by two categorised namely asset and liquidity size, and found that the smallest 
most illiquid banks were most responsive to monetary policy shocks. This findings has 
supported by Kishan and Opiela (2000) by dividing banks according to the size and 
capital strength. However, Ashcraft  (2006) has questioned the existence of the BLC in 
the US experienced. When using bank data, he identified a differential response of loan 
supply to changes in the Federal Fund Rate (FFR) across bank. However, when he 
aggregated the bank data up to the state level, the loan market share of affiliated banks 
tends to mitigate the negative response of loan supply to changes in monetary policy. In 
addition, the aggregate elasticity of output to bank lending is very small (insignificant). 
 
 Studies in the UK economy, and Euro area has also found a same conclusion, 
which is the relevance role of BLC in monetary transmission. For example, Altunvas et 
al. (2002) find that the important role of BLC in Italy and Spain, and Huang (2003) 
shows that a BLC works in the UK through reducing banks loans to small bank-
dependent firms.  
 
 In the Malaysian context, study relating to the role of the bank lending channel 
in monetary transmission is still limited in the existing literature. So far, there are 
several studies have examined the existence of the bank lending channel by using 
aggregate data [for example,  Ghazali and Abdul Rahman (2005), Karim et al. (2006) 
and Goh et al. (2007)]. Ghazali and Abdul Rahman (2005) have investigated the role of 
commercial banks’ asset (loans) and liabilities (deposit) on selected Malaysian 
macroeconomic and financial variables. By employing the aggregate data bank and a 
simple Granger causality test, they found that the significant role of bank asset that is 
bank loan in influencing the economic variables. This finding supports the active role of 
bank lending channel in transmitting the macroeconomic variables. In contrast, Goh et 
                                                                                                                                               
Italy; Haan (2003) in Netherlands; Kaufmann  (2003) in Austrian; Farinha and Marques (2003) in 
Portuguese, and Topi and Vilmunen (2003) in Finland. All studies have found that the existence of bank-
lending channel in the Euro area. 
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al.(2007) have examined the existence of bank-lending channel by using ARDL 
approach.  By using monthly aggregate data spanning from January 1990 until March 
2004, they found that, deposit tend to fall in response to the contractionary of monetary 
policy shocks. However, the banks are able to protect the customer loans from the 
reduction in deposit through an adjustment in the liquid financial instrument. This 
finding state that the tight monetary policy did not depress growth in loans.  
 
 However, Said and Ismail (2008) have used bank-level data in investigating the 
role of bank-lending channel in Malaysia. By using a static panel data framework 
spanning from 1994 until 2004, they found that the relevance of bank-lending channel 
in Malaysia. However, their result is questionable because of the coefficient of interest 
rates on bank loan is quite huge
5
. Therefore, it is expected there is a misspecification 
error in their model. In fact, as argued by Baltagi (2008), most of economic relationship 
are dynamic in nature. Thus, by using dynamic panel data framework in estimating the 
bank loans supply function, it is believed that the monetary authority can obtain an 
appropriate result for the policy purposes. 
 
3. Bank-lending channel : a theoretical model 
The bank lending channel can be analyzed by using a simple model of a profit-
maximizing bank as develop by Stein (1998), and Ehrmann et al. (2003). The model can 
be simplified as follows; 
 
Assume that, the balance sheet identity bank i  is defined as; 
 
 iiiii CBDSL ++=+                                                                                        (1) 
 
 Where L  is the volume of loans, S  is the securities, D  is the volume of the 
demand deposit from household, B  is the level of non-secured funding, and C is the 
                                                 
5
 Specifically, the finding of the results indicate that a one percentage point increase in interest rates lead 
to a decline the bank loans by 458 321.8 percent. Therefore, it is believed that their estimation model has 
a misspecification error that relating to the econometric model, and bank-loan supply equation.  
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capital of the bank. It is also assume that the bank i  acts in a loan market characterised 
by monopolistic competition. The demand for nominal bank loan diL  is given by; 
 
 pyrL iL
d
i 21,0 ααα ++−=                                                                                          (2) 
 
In equation (2), the bank individual loan is determined by loans rate ( )iLr , , aggregate 
real output ( )y , and the domestic price level ( )p ; which assumption all coefficient 10 ,αα  
and 2α  is positive. Under the Basle requirement, the bank capital is linked to the level 
of the loans and the bank’s holding of securities to the level of the deposit (liquidity 
risk). Therefore, it can be simplified as; 
 ii kLC =                                                                                                                   (3) 
 ii cDS =                                                                                                                   (4) 
 
 The demand deposit ( )D  is secured, but not bear interest. The demand deposit is 
according to the money-demand function, and demanded because of their role as a 
means of payment. Therefore, the demand deposit is negatively related to the interest 
rates of an alternatives risk-free asset ( )sr , which take to be the monetary policy rate as; 
 
 srD 0β−=    , where 00 >β                                                    (5) 
  
 In equation (5), the bank cannot influence the amount the deposit. This deposit is 
exogenous to the bank, and it will drop after the monetary tightening (after an increase 
in sr ). However, the bank have access to an alternatives source of funds, which is 
unsecured, and the bank has to pay the interest (example, inter bank loan and debt 
securities). Because of the bank are perceived to be risky, the suppliers on unsecured 
finance ask for an external finance premium. The external finance premium depends on 
a signal of the bank’s health ( )ix , which can be observed by all market participant. The 
higher the ix , the lower the external finance premium. Therefore, the interest rates of 
the unsecured financing ( )Bir  is; 
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 ( )isBi xcrr 0−= µ , where 10 ≥− ixcµ for i∀                                                              (6) 
 
 In equation (6), bank i cannot raise unsecured funds if it offered less than Bir , 
whereas it can raise any amount of fund if it pays at least Bir . Given 
B
ir is a cost factor, 
bank i  will not be ready to pay more than Bir . By assuming 0>iB , the profit of bank 
i ( )iπ  is given by; 
 
 iiBisiiLii rBrSrL ψπ −−+= ,,               (7) 
 
Where, iψ  captures bank-specific administrative costs and remuneration costs for the 
required capital holdings. By inserting equation (1)-(5) into equation (7), and assuming 
equilibrium in the loan market, yields; 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ] iBiiisiiii rDsLkrsDpyLL ψα
α
α
α
α
π −−−−−+





++−= 11
1
0
2
0
1
0
        (8) 
 
By setting the first-order condition to zero, and inserting (6) in equation (8) yields; 
 
 
( ) ( )
i
i
sisi
L
rx
kc
r
k
pyL
∂
∂
−
−
+
−
−+=
ψααµααα
22
1
2
1
22
000021                     (9) 
 
 Equation (9) is the standard loan equation in macro modelling. In equation (9), a 
monetary policy tightening through an increase in interest rates ( )sr  leads to a reduction 
in deposit in equation (5). However, bank can keep the asset side of their balance sheet 
unchanged only if they increase others sources of funding ( )iB  accordingly. But the 
interest rates a bank has to pay for these funds was increased by the monetary policy 
tightening according to the equation (6). Banks pass at least part of this higher cost to 
their loan rate ( )iLr , , which in turn reduce the loan demand. Therefore, in equation (9) it 
is expected that the monetary policy variables Sr  has a negative response to the bank 
loans.  
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 However, is it reasonable to assume that individual banks loan is also influence 
by others factors such bank asset size, bank capital, and bank deposit. Therefore, this 
study will also consider the bank balance sheet variables in estimating the banks’ loan 
supply function. Following the literature, there are three indicators widely used for 
measuring the bank characteristics such as bank size ( )itS  , liquidity ( )itLiq , and 
capitalisation ( )itCap . Specifically, the definitions of the variables are as follows: 
 
∑−=
i
it
t
itit A
N
AS log
1
log                                                                                                    (10) 
∑ 





∑−=
t i it
it
tit
it
it
A
L
NTA
L
Liq
11
                                                                                               (11) 
∑ 





∑−=
t t it
it
tit
it
it
A
C
NTA
C
Cap
11
                                                                                              (12) 
 
 Size is measured by the log of total assets ( )tiA , . Liquidity is measured as the 
ratio of liquid asset itL (cash, bank deposit and securities) to total asset. Capitalisation is 
given by the ratio of capital and reserves as a percentage of total assets. All the three 
criteria are normalised with respect to their average across all the banks in the respective 
sample. All bank characteristics will be interacted with the monetary policy variables. 
For example, by interact bank-liquidity with monetary policy ( xMPLit ), it can examine 
how the bank-loan supply response with the bank-liquidity after the monetary policy 
tightening. Therefore, the augmented loans equation in the dynamic panel data based on 
equation (9) can be specified as follows; 
 
tii
l
j
jtti
ti
l
j
jtj
l
j
jtj
l
j
jtj
l
j
jtijiit
IBORX
XGDPIBORLaL
,
0
1,1
1,
0001
, inf)log()log()log(
µηλ
γϕφαβ
+++
+++++=
∑
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=
−−
−
=
−
=
−
=
−
=
−
       (13) 
 
 Specifically, in equation (13), the bank loans supply ( )itL  is determined by 
lagged dependent variable ( )jtiL −, , monetary policy variable that is inter bank overnight 
rate ( )IBOR , gross domestic product ( )GDP , inflation rate ( )Inf , bank characteristics ( )iX , 
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and the interaction term of bank characteristics and monetary policy variables ( )IBORX i . . 
In addition, iη  is bank-specific effect, where ( )2,0~ ηση IIDi , and ti,µ  is the remainder 
error terms, which is  ( )2, ,0~ εσε IIDti . Therefore, the total error term is tiiti ,, µηε += . 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Data 
This study uses annual commercial bank balance sheet data spanning from 1993 up to 
2008 (16 years). Few banks have been operated continuously since 1993, but some 
banks are operated continuously at some later point. Therefore, the data constitute an 
unbalanced panel. Specifically, there is 37 number of commercial banks in this study, 
which is equivalence to 311 bank-year observations. The bank balance sheet data set 
(loans, asset, liquidity, and bank capital) has been collected from Bank Scope database, 
meanwhile the data of macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, and IBOR) are 
collected from International Monetary Fund.  
 
4.2 Dynamic Panel GMM 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variables in the baseline banks loan supply 
function in equation (13) implies that there is correlation between the regressors and the 
error term since the lag of banks loan supply ( ))log( , jtiL − depends on 1, −tiε , which is a 
function of the bank specific effect )( iη .  Therefore, due to this correlation, the 
dynamic panel data estimation in equation (13) suffers from Nickell (1981) bias, which 
disappears only if T  is large or approaches infinity. Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995), and  recently extended by Blundell and Bond (1998) have 
proposed generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators in order to deal the 
endogeneity problem (the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term). 
 
In order to remove the firm specific effect )( iη in equation (13), Arellano and 
Bover (1995) proposed a forward orthogonal deviation transformation or forward 
Helmert’s procedure. This transformation essentially subtracts the mean of future 
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observations available in the sample from the first  1−T  observations.  Its main 
advantage is to preserve sample size in panels with gaps. In contrast, a first-difference 
transformation has some weakness, which is, if some explanatory variable )( itx   is 
missing, then both tix ,∆  and 1, +∆ tix  are missing in the transformed data (Roodman, 
(2009a)). However, under orthogonal deviations, the transformed 1, +tix  need not go 
missing. This procedure can be expressed as follows:  
 






−= ∑
>
+
ts
is
it
ititti x
T
xcx
1
1,                                          (14) 
where itT  is the number of time-series observations on firm i , itc  is the scale factor that 
is 
1+it
it
T
T
  and iTtiit
ts
is xxxx +++= +
>
∑ ...1, . As noted by Hayakawa (2009), by using a 
Monte Carlo simulation study, the GMM estimator of the model transformed by the 
forward orthogonal deviation tends to work better than if transformed by the first 
difference. Therefore, based on this justification, this study has used forward orthogonal 
deviation transformation in order to eliminate the firm-specific variable. 
 
However, by transformation using forward orthogonal deviation, a new bias is 
introduced, that is, the correlation between the transformed error terms, and the 
transformed lagged dependent variable.  Similarly, the transformed explanatory 
variables, that is the inter bank overnight rate, the gross domestic product, the inflation 
rate, and firm characteristics are also potentially endogenous because they are related to 
the transformed error term. Therefore, three assumptions can be made regarding to the 
explanatory variables. First, an explanatory variable ( )itX  can be a predetermined 
variable that is correlated with the past error or [ ] 0≠isitXE ε  for  ts <  but [ ] 0=isitXE ε  for 
all ts ≥ . Second, an explanatory variable ( )itX can also be an endogenous variable, 
which is potentially correlated with the past and present error or [ ] 0≠isitXE ε  for ts ≤  
but [ ] 0=isitXE ε  for all ts > . Third, itX  is said to be strictly exogenous if [ ] 0=isitXE ε  
for all t  and s  which is uncorrelated with either current, past or future error.  
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 Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) recommend that the 
lagged levels or untransformed regressors are used as an instrument for the transformed 
variable. This refers to the difference GMM. However, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano 
(1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998)  show that if the lagged dependent and the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time or nearly a random walk, then lagged 
levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences. 
This happens either as the autoregressive parameter )(α  approaches unity, or as the 
variance of the individual effects )( iη  increases relative to the variance of the transient 
shocks )( itε . Hence, to decrease the potential bias and imprecision associated with the 
difference estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) have proposed a system GMM 
approach by combining both regression in differences and regression in levels. In 
addition to the regression in differences, the instruments for the regression in levels are 
the lagged differences of the corresponding instruments.  
 
However, as noted by Roodman (2009), the system GMM can generate moment 
conditions prolifically. Too many instruments in the system GMM overfits endogenous 
variable even as it weakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. Therefore, 
in order to deal with the instruments proliferation, this study will use two main 
techniques in limiting the number of instruments – such as using only certain lags 
instead of all available lags for instruments and combining instruments through addition 
into smaller sets by collapsing the block of the instrument matrix. This technique has 
been used by previous researchers, for example Calderon et al. (2002), Beck and Levine 
(2004), Cardovic and Levine (2005) and Roodman (2009b).  
 
 This study has used one-step system GMM estimation. However, for robustness 
checking, a two-step estimation in the system GMM was also considered. The success 
of the GMM estimator in producing unbiased, consistent and efficient results is highly 
dependent on the adoption of the appropriate instruments. Therefore, there are three 
specifications tests as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). First, the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample 
analogue of the moments conditions used in the estimation process. If the moment 
 12 
condition holds, then the instrument is valid and the model has been correctly specified. 
Second, it is important to test that there is no serial correlation among the transformed 
error term.  Third, to test the validity of extra moment’s conditions on the system GMM, 
the difference in Hansen test is used. This test measures the difference between the 
Hansen statistic generated from the system GMM and the difference GMM. Failure to 
reject the three null hypotheses gives support to the estimated model. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
Table 1 reports the estimation results of the determinants of the banks’ loan supply by 
using system GMM estimation. The main results are the system GMM with one-step, 
and two-step estimation. As can be seen in Table 1, in one-step estimation, monetary 
policy variable (inter bank overnight rate) is negatively, and statistically significance in 
influencing the banks’ loan supply. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the 
inter bank overnight rate lead to a contemporaneously decrease in the banks loan 
supply by 0.389 percentage point. The lagged effect of monetary policy is also 
statistically significant in influencing the banks’ loan supply, which is the banks loan 
has decreased by 0.104 percentage point in response to a one percentage point increase 
in inter bank overnight rate. This finding indicate that the relevance of bank lending 
channel (BLC) in monetary policy transmission mechanism in Malaysia. The results 
are also robust by using two-step system GMM estimation, which is both 
contemporaneous and lagged effect of monetary policy variables are negatively, and 
significantly influenced the banks loan supply. The significance of BLC in monetary 
transmission indicated that monetary policy enables to influence real sector economy 
through bank-balance sheet variables. 
 
 The interaction effect between monetary policy and bank characteristics are also 
statistically significant in influencing the banks’ loan supply. For example, the positive 
coefficient of the interaction between bank liquidity and monetary policy (Char2 x MP) 
on banks’ loan supply has indicated that a low value of bank liquidity interact with 
monetary tightening tend to reduce the banks’ loan supply. The underlying reasoning is 
that banks with more liquid balance sheet can use their liquid asset to maintain their 
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loan portfolio, and therefore are affected less heavily by a monetary contraction 
(Ehrmann et al., 2003). The interaction term between bank capitalization and monetary 
policy (Char3 x MP) is also positive and significance, which is indicated that bank with 
high capitalization ratio (high capital adequacy ratio) are enable to offer more loans 
during monetary tightening. This findings signal that a sound bank characteristics in 
term of liquidity, and bank capitalization play an important role in influencing the 
banks’ loan supply. However, the interaction term between bank asset and monetary 
policy (Char1 x MP) is not statistically significance. This indicates that bank asset or 
bank size is not relevance in influencing the banks’ loan supply.  
 
 The results of the both specification tests, that is AR(2) for testing the serial 
correlation and the Hansen test for testing the validity of instrument adopted are also 
valid. As shown in Table 1, the p-values for the AR (2) and Hansen tests are higher 
than 0.10, that is, statistically insignificant at the ten percent significance level. This 
implies that the empirical model has been correctly specified because there is no serial 
correlation (autocorrelation) in the transformed residuals, and the instruments 
(moments conditions) used in the models are valid. The additional moment conditions 
such as difference in Hansen tests are also statistically insignificant in all models but 
not reported in order to save space. 
Table 1: The Determinants of Banks’ Loan Supply Function: System GMM estimation 
one-step estimation two-step 
estimation 
 
coef. Robust standard error p-value coef. corrected standard error p-value 
Lagged  dependant variable 0.937 0.054 0.000
*** 
0.945 0.051 0.000
*** 
Inter bank overnight rate -0.389 0.190 0.041
** 
-0.357 0.156 0.022
** 
Lagged of Inter bank overnight rate -0.104 0.036 0.004
*** 
-0.085 0.027 0.002
*** 
Log of Gross domestic product 0.356 0.539 0.509 0.069 0.541 0.898 
Lagged of Log of Gross domestic product 0.807 0.439 0.066
* 
0.447 0.500 0.372 
Inflation rate 0.0925 0.047 0.051
* 
0.073 0.045 0.108 
Lagged of Inflation rate 0.087 0.053 0.101 0.061 0.040 0.128 
Char1 x MP  0.065 0.024 0.007
*** 
0.065 0.023 0.004
*** 
Char2 x MP 0.003 0.001 0.020
** 
0.003 0.001 0.035
** 
Char3 x MP 0.003 0.004 0.505 -0.0002 0.003 0.956 
Number of instruments 
Number of observations 
Number of groups 
AR(2)-p value 
Hansen test –p value 
25 
311 
35 
0.387 
0.152 
25 
311 
35 
0.368 
0.155 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of banks loan. The independent variables are the inter bank overnight rate (IBOR), log of GDP, inflation rate, and bank 
characteristics (Blundell and Bond). Char1 is the bank size, Char2 is the bank liquidity, and Char3 is the bank capitalization. Char x MP is the interaction effect between 
monetary policy (IBOR) with the bank characteristics.  *** significant at 1% level ; ** Significant at 5% percent level, and * Significant at 10% percent leve. Year dummies 
and constant are not included in order to save space. All p-value of the difference in Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments subsets have also been rejected at least at 10 
percent significant level, but not reported here. The full results are available upon request.   
 
Instrument for orthogonal deviation equation:  
Lags 2 to 3 for endogenous variables (lagged dependent variable), lags 1 to 2 for all predetermined variables (log of gross domestic product, inflation rate, and all bank 
characteristics), and all lags for strictly exogenous variable (inter bank overnight rate).  
 
The estimation also collapses the instruments matrix as proposed by Calderon et al. (2002), and Roodman (2009b). 
 
 6. Summary and Conclusion 
The role of BLC in monetary transmission has been studied extensively in advanced 
countries, however little attention has been given to investigating this issue in a 
small-open economy. Therefore, to fill this gap in the previous literature, this study 
focuses on the bank-lending channel (BLC) of monetary policy in Malaysia context 
by estimating the banks’ loan supply function using a dynamic panel data framework. 
 
 This paper found that the relevance role of bank-lending channel (BLC) of 
monetary policy in Malaysian economy. This means that the tightening of monetary 
policy is significantly influenced the banks’ loan supply, which is indicated that the 
role of commercial banks is very important in transmitted monetary policy to the real 
economic activity. The finding also indicated that significance role of bank 
characteristics variable namely bank liquidity, and bank capitalization in influencing 
the banks’ loan supply. This indicated that, during tight monetary policy, the banks 
enable to maintain their loan to the customer by using the liquidity, and bank capital 
as alternatives of loan financing because they are affected less heavily during 
monetary contraction.  
 
 This paper has several implications for implementing of monetary policy. First, 
since BLC plays a pivotal role in monetary transmission, therefore the monetary 
authority has to monitor the stability in the interest rates in order to stabilize the 
banks’ loan supply. This is because any changes in monetary policy variable, will 
affect the bank loan, and subsequently will affect the firm investment, and economic 
activity. Second, the monetary authority has also concerned the microeconomics 
aspect of bank behaviour in formulating their policy. 
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